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THE DURATION OF 
HISTORY IN BERGSON 
Caterina ZANFI
I. Is There a Philosophy of History in Bergson?
Bergson has often been criticised for not thinking history. Although he 
developed one of the most relevant philosophies of time of the last century, 
his rare statements on history are said to betray an impoverished sense 
of properly historical issues. Moreover, this criticism is made concerning 
both his consideration of history as the becoming of human reality and his 
consideration of historical knowledge and narrative — of both history and 
historiography.
It was first articulated in the 1930s by Marxist intellectuals like Paul 
Nizan (who was to perish in the fight against Nazism in 1940). In 1932, 
Nizan published a polemic entitled The Watchdogs against the so called 
“Philosophers of the Established Order.” There he includes Bergson among 
the philosophers who are “against history” (Nizan 1965, 29),1 considering 
him incapable of understanding the time and space in which philosophical 
ideas arise and therefore lacking in sensitivity for the material and embodied 
aspects of the historical becoming of philosophy. Max Horkheimer, too, 
during the first stage of his exile from Nazi Germany in Paris in 1933, 
wrote a rather polemic review of the Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. The impressionist origins of Bergson’s 
philosophy, he notes, prevented him from understanding the fundamental 
dynamics of propulsion or retardation in history, although this might 
1. Nizan’s philosophical judgement, as in that of most French intellectuals of his 
generation, was shaped by what he saw as a political fault: Bergson’s support of French 
mobilisation during the First World War.
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well be what governs “the dialectic between closed and open societies” 
(Horkheimer 1988).
Even more incisively, Jean Hyppolite, in his Introduction to Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History, stated in 1948 that “from Descartes to Bergson, 
French philosophy has always rejected history” (Hyppolite 1983, 94). And 
one year later, in a lecture at the First Argentinian National Congress of 
Philosophy, he turned more specifically to Bergson’s philosophy of history. 
His judgment, made from an existentialist point of view, was quite negative: 
Perhaps he has yielded too much to this fundamental orientation of his thought: 
‘Philosophy should be an effort to go beyond the human state,’ going from 
biological human to superman [surhomme] without stopping long enough at the 
figures of human historical existence that lie between the two (Hyppolite 1950, 
921).
Most 20th-century readers shared this kind of perspective, still present 
today:2 even if they acknowledged Bergson’s philosophy of duration to 
be deeply connected with the philosophy of life and of nature, they often 
complained about its excision of history in its properly human and cultural 
dimension. In a discussion about Bergson and history published in the 
fourth volume of Les Études bergsoniennes in 1956, even Raymond Polin 
and Raymond Aron refused to acknowledge an authentic philosophy of 
history in Bergson (Polin 1956; Aron 1956). Aron in particular disqualified 
Bergson’s theory of history, in which he found no room for the vocation 
of humanity to be realised. Nonetheless, Aron had referred to a number of 
Bergsonian ideas in his doctoral dissertation, Introduction à la philosophie 
de l’histoire, published in 1938. Bergson himself read the thesis and wrote 
a grateful letter to Aron, praising his historiographical use of the concepts 
of découpage and retrospection, whose Bergsonian inspiration was evident 
(Bergson et al. 2002, 1595; see also Aron 1938).
A similar criticism of Bergson’s theory of history can be found in a 
French thinker who was very close to Bergson and deeply immersed in 
his philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. His criticisms against Bergson 
mainly belong to the first phase of his work and were particularly explicit 
in the first phenomenological texts. In a later phase, in essays like In 
Praise of Philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1988) and The Visible and the Invisible 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968), Bergson became instead a rather positive reference, 
both for the development of his philosophy of perception and visibility, 
2. The same disappointment with Bergson’s philosophy of history is present in the recent 
Ph.D. thesis by Mélanie Weill (2019).
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and for the elaboration of a “new ontology.” Even then, when Bergson’s 
thinking was being thoroughly reassessed, Merleau-Ponty saw in Bergson’s 
philosophy of history a line he could not cross. In an essay of 1947, The 
Metaphysical in Man, he criticized Bergson pointing at the generality of his 
description of the world, and to his theory of history: 
And if, on the other hand, his philosophy is finally to be understood as a philosophy 
of immanence, he may be reproached with having described the human world 
only in its most general structures (e.g., duration, openness to the future); his work 
lacks a picture of human history which would give a content to these intuitions, 
which paradoxically remain very general (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 97).
In the lecture course on nature he gave at the Collège de France, Merleau-
Ponty acknowledged that Bergson was thinking a limited Absolute in 
the natural domain but asserted this not to be the case in the historical 
domain. According to Merleau-Ponty, there was in Bergson no “historical 
inscription,” no “calling and responding generations,” only a “heroic 
appeal from individual to individual, a mystique without a ‘mystical body’” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 188). The reassessment of Bergson’s philosophy 
seemed to positively invest the intuition of duration and of life but couldn’t 
afford the philosophy of The Two Sources and in particular its philosophy of 
history. It was precisely the tension with this aspect of Bergsonian thought 
that nourished Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history in the 1950s, along 
the lines of his reflections on expressivity and the institution (Belot 2006; 
Caeymaex 2017). For Merleau-Ponty — who was seeking a history “in 
the making” (se faisant), a positive evaluation of the social and impersonal 
dimension, prior to the personal dimension — Bergson could not offer a 
satisfactory model for the philosophy of history: 
During the long years he was preparing the Two Sources, he does not seem 
to have impregnated himself with history as he had with life; he did not find 
‘complementary powers of understanding’ on terms with our own duration, 
working in history as formerly he had found them working in life (Merleau-
Ponty 1964a, 188).
Today, however, when the separation between nature and culture, and 
between nature and history, has come into crisis,3 it is possible to reconsider 
the philosophy of history in Bergson’s work (and especially in his last work, 
3. The need for a redefinition of history in the context of today’s planetary crisis has 
been given in the clearest and strongest way by Chakrabarty (2009), and reiterated in a 
Bergsonian context in the discussion with Frédéric Worms at the Penn State conference 
on Global Bergsonism in November 2020. See also the very Bergsonian remarks on 
history in the context of the recent pandemic events in Worms (2021).
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The Two Sources), and to assess its fertility in today’s debate. Does Bergson 
really have such a compromised relationship with history? Is he really 
insensitive to the specificity of the historical dimension, as Hyppolite, 
Polin, Aron, and others claim? And does he really remain trapped in an 
individualist spiritualism that prevents him from grasping the properly 
historical collective dimension, as Merleau-Ponty asserts? 
Or is he instead trying to define history in a new way that cannot be 
found in the traditional opposition to the sciences of nature, a new way 
that — because of its novel and nuanced approach — might be fertile in 
understanding today’s planetary historical crisis?
II. History as the Domain of Freedom
When we look at the earliest references Bergson makes to the philosophy of 
history, we find a rather traditional distinction between history and nature 
that parallels the distinction between freedom and necessity, consciousness 
and matter.
Bergson begins the 1911 Oxford lecture, “The Perception of Change,” by 
tracing this parallel: 
What holds good for the present of the individuals, holds also for the present of 
nations: an event belongs to the past, and enters into history when it is no longer 
of any direct interest to the politics of the day and can be neglected without the 
affairs of the country being affected by it (Bergson 2009a, 169; 1946, 179).
Past and present, like memory, probably work for the individual as well 
as for the collectivity. Like consciousness, history belongs to the domain 
of freedom. Bergson soon developed this idea further in a talk he gave 
in 1913 following his election as president of the London Society for 
Psychical Research, “‘Phantasms of the Living’ and ‘Psychical research.’” 
After voicing a rather surprising support for the analogy between psychic 
and natural phenomena, arguing that both are subject to laws, Bergson 
distinguishes these types of facts from the facts that belong to history. He 
affirms the heterogeneity of historical and natural phenomena: 
History does not repeat itself. The battle of Austerlitz was fought once, and it 
will never be fought again. It being impossible that the same historical conditions 
should ever be reproduced, the same historical fact could never be repeated; and 
as a law expresses necessarily that to certain causes, always the same, there will 
correspond effects, also always the same, history, strictly speaking, has no bearing 
on laws, but on particular facts and on the no less particular circumstances in 
which they were brought to pass (Bergson 2009b, 64; 1920, 78-79).
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Negating historical laws and their rootedness in life, Bergson confirms the 
separation — widely discussed in Germany in the preceding decades — 
between the so called Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. This 
division was defended by neo-Kantian philosophers in particular. Thinkers 
such as Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband affirmed the radical 
heterogeneity of history and the natural sciences with the same arguments 
Bergson employs in his 1913 lecture. Indeed, Bergson’s definition seems 
literally to cite one of the central theses advance by Windelband, who 
considered history an idiographic science, dealing with singular and unique 
facts, and defined the natural sciences as nomothetic sciences, searching for 
laws, repetitions, and causal relations (Windelband 1924). This analogy 
between Bergson and the historicist positions of the Heidelberg neo-
Kantians, however, might be deceiving because it follows the introduction 
Windelband wrote to the German translation of Matter and Memory, 
published by Diederichs in 1909.4 The Heidelberg professor presented 
Bergson’s philosophy as a French answer to the dominance of scientism 
and naturalism. The German answer to the same problem, on this reading, 
were the historical sciences. Windelband also noted that the key concept 
of Bergson’s philosophy of duration, denying the idea of the repetition of 
the “identical,” was the “event.” With this term — Geschehen in German 
— Windelband referred to the singular and irreplaceable event and at the 
same time alluded to the category of history, Geschichte, which in German 
has the same root.
III. The “Law” of History
In his 1932 book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson returns 
to the concept of history and develops it in much greater detail. In his 
definition, he abandons once and for all any affinity with neo-critical 
systems, like Windelband’s, in which history is guided by transcendental 
values. Bergson’s research led him to develop a philosophy of history 
consistent with his empirical approach and with his own philosophy of 
duration. In The Two Sources, there are epistemological analogies of history 
with his duration-based psychology and biology, as well as ontological 
analogies of historical time with duration and evolution, all traced back 
to a single creative movement. Bergson’s philosophy of history now allows 
for thinking the metaphysical unity of nature and history: the extension 
4. Windelband 1908. These pages were removed from subsequent editions of Materie 
und Gedächtnis starting in 1919. For the history of the translations and the reception of 
Bergson’s works in Germany see Zanfi (2013a).
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of the logic of continuity and becoming from life to history establishes a 
homogeneity between the logic of life and the logic of human actions.
The law of history Bergson introduced in The Two Sources is not separate 
from the biological domain but instead refers directly to the law of 
dichotomy expounded in Creative Evolution,5 which it shifts from the 
original biological perspective to a historical perspective.
In the last chapter of the 1932 work, Bergson enquires into the reasons for 
the frenetic course of industrial development in his time and introduces 
the notion that historical development is characterised by a bidirectional 
tendency.6 In history, the spiritual and material progress of humanity 
alternate: each of these tendencies must push itself to its extreme before it 
is overtaken by the other, which in turn is pushed to the extreme before 
being overtaken as well, and so on.
Bergson identifies two opposing trends, one leading to simplicity and the 
other to complication, one to sobriety and the other to luxury. The former 
is a tendency of moral development, the latter of technical development. 
Bergson refers to this opposition as the dichotomy of mechanics and 
mysticism — hence the rather enigmatic title of the fourth and last chapter 
of the book: “Final Remarks: Mechanics and Mysticism.”7
Bergson thus interprets the materialistic frenzy he observes in the 1930s as 
the culmination of one of the two directions of human development, which 
will be followed by the resumption of spiritual and moral development. 
In short, historical development in Bergson follows a dichotomous course 
modelled on the biological law that governs the evolution of nature. The 
Two Sources articulates the union of human history and natural social 
history in its formulation of the “law of double frenzy” that explains the 
5. This law summarises the divergent paths taken by evolution — from plant to animal 
and from animal to human being; see Bergson (1911, 111 ff).
6. Philippe Soulez traces the genesis of the philosophy of history from a biological 
scheme back to the need to find a way out of the situation in which modern industrial 
civilisation finds itself: “since humanity is stuck at an impasse, a guiding principle must 
be found that allows for thinking, against the backdrop of discontinuity, the continuous 
sequence history makes legible that has given rise to industrial society but to do so 
without renouncing the idea of conserving what has been gained along the way” (Soulez 
1989, 294).
7. For an interpretation of this unusual dichotomy, see Zanfi (2013b). Rates (2017) 
addresses the articulation of the philosophy of technology and history in Creative 
Evolution, and places the topic within a broader discussion of the concepts of nature and 
culture in the thesis (Rates 2019).
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movement of the “habits of life,” of its “vital tendency” (Bergson 2008, 
313; 1935, 282).
To introduce this law, Bergson recalls “alternations of ebb and flow in 
history” (Bergson 1935, 286). The phrase echoes the “corsi e ricorsi” or 
cyclical recurrences of Giambattista Vico, whom Jules Michelet, another 
protagonist in the anti-Cartesian line of French philosophy, translated into 
French in 1835 (Vico 1835). Bergson moreover insists that recourse to the 
term “law” is neither a concession to determinism or finalism, nor does it 
imply historical fatalism: 
We do not believe in the fatality of history. There is no obstacle which cannot be 
broken down by wills sufficiently keyed up, if they deal with it in time. There is 
thus no unescapable historic law. But there are biological laws; and the human 
societies, in so far as they are partly willed by nature, pertain to biology on this 
particular point. If the evolution of the organized world takes place according 
to certain laws, I mean by virtue of certain forces, it is impossible that the 
psychological evolution of individual and social man should entirely renounce 
these habits of life (Bergson 2008, 312-313; 1935, 253).
Laws of this kind only admit of an imperfect but nonetheless “sufficient 
regularity” in the becoming of human societies.
IV. The Fatality of Progress
Bergson’s idea of time-invention contradicts the idea of historical fatality. 
There is no teleology, no determinism, no eschatological tendency — all 
of them essential assumptions in most philosophies of history. Instead, as 
Raymond Aron notes in his dissertation, Bergson founds his philosophy of 
history on the notion of a retrospective illusion of fatality. 
All retrospective judgements are illusions: what he theorised for the 
intellect can also be applied in the domain of historical knowledge, 
Bergson argues in the introductions to The Creative Mind. Historical 
fatality only appears from the point of view of the observer who has already 
lived, not from the point of view of the one who lives. As duration, and as 
life, history is a succession of unpredictable novelty. That is why, when he 
introduces the image of the oscillatory movement of human history, the 
illustration Bergson chooses is not the image of a pendulum but that of 
spiral movement: ebb and flow have memory, and their movements never 
completely overlap, precisely because they explain the development and 
growth of the original tendency they express: the pendulum is endowed 
with memory, and is not the same when it swings back as on the outward 
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swing, since it is then richer by all the intermediate experience. This is 
why the image of a spiral movement, which has sometimes been used, is 
perhaps more correct than that of the oscillations of a pendulum.
In a 1930 essay on “the tragedies of progress” that Bergson quotes in The 
Two Sources, Gina Lombroso describes a similar oscillatory movement but 
paints the alternation of material and moral progress in more sombre tones. 
For her, “every civilisation is made up of various tendencies, each of which, 
after a certain period of development, exhausts its force of ascent and, 
after a more or less extended period of stasis, passes into descent, which 
movement is almost always contemporary with an evolution in another 
field.” On this basis, she defines progress as a “sinuous march” similar to 
movement of growth in the human organism.8 According to Lombroso, 
the problems of contemporary industrialism cannot be overcome through 
a return to an alleged origin. Like the movement of life, the dual movement 
of history — be it a sinus wave, a polarised spiral, an alternation of ebb and 
flow — involves growth that takes place in the emergence of new historical 
circumstances that are just as unrepeatable as the ones that preceded them.
For Bergson, there are two models for this movement. On the one hand, 
there is biology: “There is thus no unescapable historic law. But there are 
biological laws; and the human societies, in so far as they are partly willed 
by nature, pertain to biology on this particular point.” On the other hand, 
there is memory: “the pendulum is endowed with memory” (Bergson 2008, 
313; 1935, 252). Not only the directions of the evolution of life but, more 
profoundly, the rhythm of duration envelop human history. 
Bergson’s theory seems indeed to amalgamate cyclical visions of history with 
linear visions and to exorcise the risks of each: the repetition of the identical 
cyclical history implies, and the finality of progress linear history implies. 
In this framework, the frequent references in The Two Sources to the 
historical experience of the First World War and its lessons are significant: 
Bergson reflects on his contemporaries’ clear perception of the risk of a 
catastrophe, of annihilation, and of its deep connection with our own 
technological nature and attitude of exploitation. Already in Creative 
Evolution, intelligence was considered a vital faculty developed to survive 
and to master matter. And although intelligence contributes to the evolution 
of life and its tools can produce new feelings and new possibilities for our 
consciousness, fabrication entails great risks for humanity. Machines meant 
8. Bergson quotes the French translation (Lombroso 1931) in Bergson (2008, 318; 
1935, 258). The essay has also been translated into English (Lombroso-Ferrero 1931). 
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to liberate us can actually come to dominate us, and our historical horizon 
is not free of disaster: humanity cannot take any future for granted.
After the catastrophe of the First World War and the frenzy of industrial 
development in the 1920s, Bergson was more conscious than ever of the 
fragility of civilisation and of the insecurity of the human condition in the 
world. This only bolstered his abandonment of any comforting optimism 
that would count on the realization of a cosmic or historical order. In 
1932, Bergson’s vision of history implies a radical disillusion about the 
idea of continuous progress.
Despite the possible threats considered in the last chapter of The Two Sources 
in particular, Bergson’s philosophy does not imply any nostalgic retreat to 
a lost, happier, and safer time, any primitivist temptation, any nostalgia for 
a lost origin, for a lost paradise of any kind. And this is perfectly consistent 
with his refusal to project a final, absolute liberation. There has never been 
an original paradise and there will never be a paradise at the end of times. 
Such theories would imply a teleology and dualism in which mechanics 
and mysticism would be opposites. In the final chapter of The Two Sources, 
both are on the contrary considered means of liberation for humanity. But 
this liberation, this “progress” is never completed. There is a call and a need 
for creation which prevents any static achievement — anything “tout fait,” 
as Bergson would have said.
Bergson’s philosophy of history, like his cosmology, presumes neither an 
origin nor a finality: there is neither creation ex nihilo (there is no nihil!) 
nor is there room for messianic hope. In Bergson’s thought, eternity would 
coincide with the process of temporal creation. The Absolute is in the 
making, it is duration. In the domain of the philosophy of history, this 
strict refusal of determinism and of finality represents the end of an illusion 
of security and of a number of optimistic myths that characterised 19th-
century philosophy and culture, not only in their dialectic and positivist 
versions but in spiritualist faith in a providential order of history or in a 
finality of nature as well.
Despite his opposition to fatality and finality, Bergson keeps referring to 
“progress”: even in history, even in the law of double frenzy, the “struggle” 
between the moral and the material impulse is said to be but a “superficial 
aspect of an advance” (Bergson 2008, 317; 1935, 257). What kind of 
advance and progress does Bergson have in mind?
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Charles Péguy, in Clio, his essay on history written 1909-1913 (and thus 
long before the publication of The Two Sources) and published after his 
death, lays out a similar vision of progress:
The modern world finds itself here, contemplates and takes pleasure in itself, 
cherishes itself in one of its essential institutions […] [T]his theory of progress 
essentially comes down to a savings bank theory. It supposes, it creates an 
automatic little intellectual savings bank for each of us, automatic in the sense 
that we always pay in and never withdraw (Péguy 1942, 48-49).
The modern idea of progress is linked to the bourgeois idea of saving, and 
it contradicts the very workings of nature, which as it advances expends 
and wastes a part of itself: “Nature, as you know, reality, the organic, too, is 
governed by another law. There is loss, perpetual privation, wear, inevitable 
friction, which is in no way accidental but part of the game, of the rules 
of the game” (Péguy 1942, 49-50). Péguy’s philosophy of history was not 
just influenced by Bergson’s theory of memory (Creyghton 2011), but 
also by Bergson’s philosophy of life, as exposed in Creative Evolution. He 
juxtaposes the modern and distorted idea of historical progress with the 
rhythm of Bergsonian duration:
That is progress, as they say. But I know that there is an entirely different time, that 
the event, reality, the organic follows an entirely different time, follows a duration, 
a rhythm of duration, which must be called Bergsonian duration because it was 
he who discovered this new world, this eternal world (Péguy 1942, 52). 
Yet, as Raymond Polin remarks in his 1956 essay, progress in Bergson’s 
thinking has a double meaning: (1) progress as a principle of foresight, as 
the development of a prior direction, a fatal destiny of historical becoming, 
a notion Bergson opposes as a version of finality; (2) and a sort of “open 
progress,” which Bergson endorses, that allows for a movement of growth, 
an evolution, an advancement of civilisation (Polin 1956, 33). In keeping 
with his philosophy of duration, this is a discontinuous, undetermined 
progress, defined by creative acts and the diffusion of mystic love.
V. History of Humanity and History of Nature
Such a philosophy of history, which might seem reduced to the psychological 
theory of memory and duration as well as to the model of biological 
evolution, also has a profound impact on Bergson’s anthropological 
position. Introduced in the biological framework of Creative Evolution as 
a living species, humanity is first of all one species among all the others. 
Even if Bergson defines humanity differently than he does other species — 
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because of its intelligence, its language, and its aptitude for fabrication and 
social life — humanity remains a biological species.
Bergson also insists on the continuity between natural history and human 
history, despite the saltus the human species has taken. But he insists just 
as strongly that naturalism does not apply in the field of history: there is no 
history before there are humans; animals, for example, do not have history. 
One reason is that the law of two-fold frenzy differs slightly from the law 
that governs evolution:
[I]n the general evolution of life, the tendencies thus created by a process of 
dichotomy are to be found in species different from one another; they have set 
forth, each independently, to seek their fortunes in the world; and the material 
form they have assumed prevents them from reuniting to bring back again, 
stronger than it was, more complex, more fully evolved, the original tendency. 
Not so in the evolution of the psychical and social life. Here the tendencies, born 
of the process of splitting, develop in the same individual, or in the same society. 
As a rule, they can only be developed in succession (Bergson 2008, 314; 1935, 
254-255).
There is, however, another reason that distinguishes human history from 
the history of life in general: the special role of individuals in history. The 
past that precedes humanity is marked by the appearance of new species, 
and only with humanity do we witness a historical development: the 
history of this particular species developing through the ages, marked by 
events and by the lives and achievements of individuals. History concerns 
humanity alone. Raymond Aron stresses the political significance of the 
role The Two Sources attributes to individuals in history:
Perhaps the existence of a few people is the supreme achievement, if it is in 
them and in them alone that spirit finally overcome nature. A direct line would 
then lead from Time and Free Will to The Two Sources: the consciousness of the 
individual is the true history: duration against space, love against social servitude. 
We have no right to despair of societies since the hero sweeps them up in charging 
the heavens, no right to trust them since the weight of the past and of collective 
necessities leads them back to their nature — which is enjoyment and combat 
(Aron 1956, 50-51).
It nevertheless deserves emphasising that even great individuals cannot do 
without a collective effort and without conveying their emotion to a group 
— be it a small monastic community or an international organisation like 
the League of Nations. History is inextricably personal and impersonal, 
subjective and epochal. An individualistic reading of The Two Sources 
would be partial.
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This aspect of Bergson’s last book is not new: the inseparability of 
individuality and collectivity in historical movements reflects the 
heterogeneity of temporal rhythms Bergson described in earlier works. In 
Matter and Memory, materiality is not extraneous to duration, and already 
in Creative Evolution technical objects, which impact communities, 
participate in duration and gain significance in historical becoming. 
Probably the most important step toward the considerations on “mechanics 
and mysticism” in The Two Sources is the passage on the steam-engine in 
Creative Evolution: Newcomen’s invention marks one of the decisive — 
today we would say “disruptive” — moments in human history, an event 
that shapes its age more than any other:
In thousands of years, when, seen from the distance, only the broad lines of 
the present age will still be visible, our wars and our revolutions will count for 
little, even supposing they are remembered at all; but the steam-engine, and 
the procession of inventions of every kind that accompanied it, will perhaps be 
spoken of as we speak of the bronze or of the chipped stone of prehistoric times: 
it will serve to define an age (Bergson 2007, 139-140; 1911, 146).
This closer look at Bergson’s philosophy of history thus does not simply 
correct some misunderstandings, according to which he would have 
excised history from his philosophy or centered his theory of history on the 
role of individuals. It also reveals a philosophical and cultural significance 
that speaks to us today. This is particularly the case for the articulation 
of history and nature, as Jean Hyppolite remarked as early as 1949 in his 
Argentina lecture:
Bergson’s philosophy is a philosophy of life before it is a philosophy of human 
history. Bergson’s concepts, élan vital, creative evolution, dichotomy and double 
frenzy, suit life and are not specifically tailored to the history of humanity, as 
they are in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for example. Bergson, in contrast, 
shows us the relationship between human history and the general evolution of 
life, between civilisation and nature (Hyppolite 1950, 915).
The great novelty of Bergson’s philosophy, especially when we consider 
the cultural atmosphere of his time, consists precisely in the articulation 
of human history and the general evolution of life, of the two realms of 
history and nature, or of civilization and life.
On the one hand, Bergson seems to borrow the laws of history from 
nature. Yet the link between history and nature is not an extension of the 
principle of deterministic causality to the level of history; on the contrary, 
he contests the validity of such a principle on the very level of nature 
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itself. The recognition of regularity at the natural and the historical level 
cannot be reduced to a naturalistic position in the sense in which the term 
naturalism was used in the 19th century. In acknowledging the evolutionary 
character of history and in referring to the law of dichotomy, Bergson does 
not describe an automatic oscillation or an eternal repetition of the same 
course of events, but rather a creative spiral movement that cannot go back 
and take the same steps once more.
On the other hand, the evolution of life itself seems to be deeply historical. 
While Bergson’s philosophy of evolution inspires his philosophy of history, 
there is also, as Jean Hyppolite remarked, “a historical aspect of evolution, 
which does not actualise a ready-made plan” (Hyppolite 1950, 915). 
Bergson himself makes the same point in a letter to Harald Höffding in 
1915: 
The essential argument I aim at mechanism in biology is that it does not explain 
how life unfolds a history, that is to say, a succession in which there is no repetition, 
in which every moment is unique and bears in itself the representation of the 
whole past (Bergson 1972, 1149).
To appreciate the novelty of Bergson’s solution, we must not forget that 
philosophy in his time was in crisis, under pressure from the natural 
sciences as well as the social sciences that emerged from 19th-century 
positivism. At its most influential, positivism in the footsteps of Spencer 
considered biological evolutionism to be the key to interpreting every 
domain of human psychological and social life. Like some of the most 
advanced European philosophers, Bergson tried to find a way to pass 
between the Scylla of naturalism and Charybdis of metaphysics. Bergson 
avoids on the one hand Croce’s historicist idealism, according to which 
anything can be subsumed under human thought and everything has an 
historical dimension, as if there were no world but the human world, and as 
if even nature had history. Bergson also, and most importantly, avoids the 
objectivation, the naturalization of history, opposing the rather crude and 
naïf attitude of Spencerian social scientists who used physiological laws to 
justify all social and cultural phenomena. Both sets of arguments, idealist 
and naturalist, existed alongside the distinction between history and nature. 
With his effort to embed nature and history in the more comprehensive 
category of life, Bergson’s position also differs from contemporary German 
organic vitalism, and from a demonism of power opposed to reason and 
ethics. Bergsonian biology — biology in the “very wide meaning it should 
have” (Bergson 1935, 82) — brings together morality, history, culture, 
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and sociology, and his philosophy of life comprehends both the closed 
tendencies toward war and conservation, and the open tendencies toward 
peace and creation.
If there is no full-fledged philosophy of history in Bergson, that is because 
he abandons the traditional distinction between nature and history: 
his comprehensive philosophy of life has embedded this duality in a 
biological movement of creation that can explain the shared evolution 
of nature and humanity. This theoretical shift seems to anticipate the 
evolution of contemporary historiography. Especially in the last thirty 
years, as awareness of the climate crisis has grown, the duality of nature 
and history has become increasingly obsolete, which poses a “challeng[e 
to] our capacity for historical understanding,” as Chakrabarty observes. 
The modern, Viconian-Hobbesian humanist separation between natural 
history and human history that was commonplace until the nineteenth and 
even into 20th century, has now collapsed. The awareness that humanity 
is a “geological force” and the emergence of new fields of research such 
as environmental history require historians, as well philosophers, to put 
“global histories” — especially of the last three centuries — “in conversation 
with the species history of humans” (Chakrabarty 2009, 201, 207).
And that, precisely, was what Bergson laid out: a history in which there is 
no divorce from our living background, which does not believe us capable 
of completely abandoning our natural conditions, in which the “laws” of 
history reflect the movement of the evolution of life; and also, a history 
propelled by the actions of great human individuals as well as by non-
human agents such as technical objects and conditions of access to natural 
resources. Deploying the richness of durée on the level of history, Bergson 
points to a way of understanding history in its vital and widest meaning: 
as the memory of the world.
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***
Abstract: Although he developed one of the most important modern theories of time, 
Bergson has often been criticised for not thinking history. Drawing on his writings from 
Creative Evolution to The Two Sources, I show that, on the contrary, he was trying to define 
history in a new way, one that would not be exhausted by the traditional opposition to the 
natural sciences. Bergson’s new philosophy of history, free of teleology and determinism, 
allows us to think the specificity of the human historical dimension without erasing its 
articulation with natural evolution. Against the critical readings Aron and Merleau-Ponty 
have offered, I maintain that Bergson’s philosophy does not withdraw into an individualist 
spiritualism but includes the collective dimension and the history of non-human, both 
natural and technological, reality.
Keywords: Henri Bergson, philosophy of history, philosophy of nature, anthropology, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Péguy.
Résumé : Bien qu’il ait développé l’une des théories du temps les plus marquantes de 
la modernité, on a souvent reproché à Bergson de ne pas avoir pensé l’histoire. En nous 
appuyant sur ses écrits, de L’Évolution créatrice aux Deux Sources, je montre qu’il cherchait 
plutôt à définir l’histoire d’une manière nouvelle, qui pourrait ne pas se retrouver 
dans l’opposition traditionnelle aux sciences de la nature. La nouvelle philosophie de 
l’histoire de Bergson, libérée de la téléologie et du déterminisme, nous permet de penser 
la spécificité de la dimension historique de l’homme sans effacer son articulation avec 
l’évolution naturelle. Contredisant les lectures critiques d’Aron et de Merleau-Ponty, la 
philosophie de Bergson n’est pas enfermée dans un spiritualisme individualiste, mais 
inclut la dimension collective et l’histoire de la réalité non humaine — tant naturelle que 
technologique.
Mots-clés : Henri Bergson, philosophie de l’histoire, philosophie de la nature, anthro-
pologie, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Péguy.

